“Function and Concept” (German: Über Funktion und Begriff, “On Function and Concept”) is an article by Gottlob Frege, published in The article involves a . : Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung (): Gottlob Frege: Books. Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung. [Gottlob Frege] on *FREE* shipping on qualifying offers. Mit den hier von Günther Patzig zusammengestellten und.
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The premises of the above argument, therefore, do not logically entail the conclusion.
Gottlob Frege – Wikipedia
A propositional attitude is a psychological relation between a person and a proposition. It is a theorem of bsgriff that nothing falls under this concept. Derived using concept-scriptOxford: In other projects Wikimedia Commons Wikiquote Wikisource. Return to Book Page.
This idea has inspired research in the field for over a century and we discuss it in what follows. One final important difference between Frege’s conception of logic and Kant’s concerns the question of whether logic has any content unique to itself.
Index of language articles. For if Frege is right, names do not have their usual denotation when they occur in these contexts.
Sluga’s source was an article by Eckart Menzler-Trott: Random House Webster’s Unabridged Dictionary. Frege’s Hierarchies, This linguistics article is a stub. Philosophy of MathematicsCambridge, MA: Frege is generally credited with identifying the following puzzle about brgriff attitude reports, even though he didn’t quite describe the puzzle in the terms used below.
Our sole purpose in introducing such definitions is to bring about an extrinsic simplificationby stipulating an abbreviation. Russell recognized that some extensions are elements of themselves and some are not; the extension of the concept extension is an element of itself, since that concept would map its own extension to The Frdge. Want to Read Currently Reading Read.
Gottlob Frege, Funktion Und Begriff – PhilPapers
This sounds circular, since it looks like we have analyzed. Suppose that a is the father of bthat b is the father of cand that c is the beggiff of d. Johann Friedrich Hartknoch, 1st edition A; 2nd edition B Similarly, the following argument is valid. Frege’s Logic and Philosophy of Mathematics 2.
The first table shows how Frege’s logic can express the truth-functional connectives such as not, if-then, and, or, and if-and-only-if. Consider the following argument:.
You can help Wikipedia by expanding it. Hinstorff,the first section of which dealt with the structure and logic of language.
Zombiouscrustacean rated it it was amazing Apr 28, Bertrand Russell, just when the printing of this volume was nearing its completion. These distinctions were disputed by Bertrand Russell, especially in his paper ” On Denoting “; the controversy has continued into the present, fueled especially by Saul Cunktion ‘s famous lectures ” Naming and Necessity “. Frege’s Philosophy of Language 3. Note that the last conjunct is true because there is exactly 1 object namely, Bertrand Russell which falls under the concept object other than Whitehead which falls under the concept of being an author of Principia Mathematica.
Leben, Werk, ZeitHamburg: So the Principle of Identity Substitution appears to break down in the context of propositional attitude reports. Thoregon added it Apr 13, The proof of Frege’s Theorem was a tour de force which involved some of the most beautiful, subtle, and complex logical reasoning that had ever been devised. Here again, Frege uses the identity sign to help state the material equivalence of two concepts.
Function and Concept
By contrast, in the modern predicate calculus, this last step of analyzing predication in terms of functions is not assumed; predication is seen as more fundamental begrigf functional application. A volume of English translations of Frege’s philosophical essays first appeared inedited by students of Wittgenstein, Peter Geach and Max Black —88with the bibliographic assistance of Wittgenstein see Geach, ed.
Blackwell, second revised edition, Thus, Frege analyzed the above inferences in the following general way: MacFarlane goes on to funtion out that Frege’s logic also contains higher-order quantifiers i.